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Is Nation-Building A Myth?

Nation-Building is an Oxymoron
M. Chris Mason

Abstract: Nations are not built. They form almost imperceptibly
from within over long spans of historical time. Since the end of World
War II, no country that was not a nation has ever won a counterinsurgency or suppressed a civil war. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency
is wrong because it is premised on the false assumption that support for an existing government can be increased during a civil war/
insurgency as a result of the counterinsurgents’ actions. There is no
historical evidence to support this assumption.

F

our times since 1963, in Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq,
the US military has been sent to do what was literally impossible.
A total of 64,969 American military personnel have died so far
in these Quixotic misadventures. Adding to the tragedy of these failures
is the sense of futility that the fundamental lesson has not been learned.
Arguments continue about tactics in these wars, and debates go on about
how success was possible if we had done this or that; if we had just
sent in more troops, for example, or kept them there longer, or local
corruption had been reduced, or there had been less restrictive rules
of engagement (ROE). But the United States did not lose these wars
because the tactics were wrong, though they were, but because in each
case, the United States was attempting to do something impossible: build
a nation. To make an analogy, US political and military engagement in
these conflicts was like polishing the hubcaps on an old junk car with a
broken frame and no engine rotting into the ground at a scrapyard, and
thinking the result would be reliable transportation if one just added
some mud flaps (i.e., 50,000 more troops) or a chrome tailpipe (i.e., different rules of engagement). In fact, the dead hulk was never going to
run, and which polish was used or which accessories were bolted on
would not have changed the laws of physics. This essay is an effort to
lay out those basic laws of political science before this kind of magical
thinking is attempted again.
A nation is a country or a territory in which the great majority of
the inhabitants center their personal identities at a national level.1 For
example, “I am German,” or “I am Kurdish.” This sense of personal
identity as a member of a homogenous group in a defined area may
be derived in a number of ways. For example, it may be derived ethni1      The author would like to thank Dr. Kalev Sepp at the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Tom
Marks at the National Defense University, and Dr. Paul Pillar of Georgetown University’s Center
for Security Studies for their work and intellectual contributions to the writing of this article. The
common dictionary definition is “a large aggregate of people united by common descent, history,
culture, or language, inhabiting a particular country or territory.” The Merriam Webster Dictionary.
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cally or linguistically, or both. In some cases historically it has derived
from religious or sectarian origins. The Sikh empire of South Asia in
the 18th and 19th centuries is one example of a nation derived from a
religion in the modern era. France and Germany are examples of nations
whose inhabitants are genetically similar but whose national identity is
primarily derived linguistically and culturally. One group of people says
“I am French,” and the other says “I am German,” yet the people of
both nations are primarily of Celtic, Germanic, Frank and Gallo-Roman
origins. On the other hand, a nation may also be derived ethnically in
spite of a common language and a common religion. The languages
Uzbek and Turkmen are about 90 percent mutually-intelligible, about the
same degree of mutual understanding that typical men from Maine and
Georgia had in the United States in 1860, but the Uzbek and Turkmen
peoples consider themselves to be separate and distinct nations based on
ethnic differences.2 The key point is this: Without historical exception,
however this sense of nationhood is derived, a nation is formed by a
slow, evolutionary social process in which a group of people coalesce
around a shared national identity within defined geographical borders
over a period of centuries.
“Nation-building” is, therefore, an oxymoron. No nation has ever
been “built” in recorded history in the sense of this social evolution
being accelerated by a political process, much less created at gunpoint
by an occupying power, as was attempted, for example, at the end of the
20th century in Vietnam and Somalia, and at beginning of this century
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is because nations are not “built”: they
accrete, like stalagmites. Without historical exception, the development
of nations has been, and remains, an evolutionary process which occurs
over the span of many, many human generations. This is not semantics,
or pedantry. This is the fundamental underlying law of international
political science. It is the one, often-ignored but essential truth of foreign
policy, and it should be the cardinal rule determining the nature of US
military engagement anywhere on earth, because it will predict negative outcomes with 100 percent accuracy. We may call this fundamental
principle of political science—that nations are not built but accrete over
historical time—the Nation Rule.
The First Corollary of the Nation Rule is that no country in world
history which was not a nation has ever become a successful democracy.
When a country is a nation, democracy becomes possible and may become
that nation’s system of government—if a number of other necessary
social preconditions are met. Obviously, democracy is not an inevitable
outcome of being a nation. Cuba and China, for example, are modern
nations (again, a country or territory in which the great majority of the
people self-identify at the level of the nation, whether it is recognized
as a country or not) but they are dictatorships. The other precursors of
democracy, in addition to nationhood, include, but are not limited to, a
level of basic universal literacy, a functioning and reasonably fair, uncorrupt, and prompt justice system, a set of universally-acknowledged social
values which prioritize and protect individual legal and civil rights over
those of a collective, a shared sense of social fairness, and basic trust in
2      Robert Lindsay, “Mutual Intelligibility Among the Turkic Languages,” Beyond Highbrow, January
4, 2010, https://robertlindsay.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/mutual-intelligibility-among-the-turkic
-languages.
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one’s fellow citizens. A country whose families live within walled forts
and post armed guards at night against their neighbors, for example,
self-evidently lacks the basic social trust which is an essential precursor
of democracy. Even in a society which has all of these things, democracy
may still fail, as it did spectacularly in Weimar Germany in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, for example. Like nation formation, democracy, too, is a
long and winding evolutionary road with many possible detours to ruin.
The other basic elements of democracy may exist to somewhat
greater or somewhat lesser extents, but the inescapable central truth of
this corollary is that without the existence of a nation upon which to
build, these other precursors cannot grow and evolve into the fabric of
society which can be a democracy. Nationhood is literally the foundation
of democracy, the sine qua non upon which the complex socioeconomic
building blocks of sustainable representative government are gradually
built over a period of centuries. Historically, there are no exceptions.
The rejection of history and the vast body of empirical evidence derived
from centuries of human experience in favor of another opinion is
the dictionary definition of magical thinking—“the belief that…
one’s thought, words, or actions can achieve specific physical effects
in a manner not governed by the principles of ordinary transmission
of energy or information.”3 In layman’s terms, magical thinking is the
belief that wanting something to be possible makes it possible, or that
wanting a thing to happen can make it happen, in violation of fundamental principles of political science or a unanimity of historical experience
which proves it to be impossible. Unfortunately, it is practiced all too
frequently by politicians, military leaders and diplomats.
In seeking to find an exception to the timespan of the Nation Rule,
one is tempted to put forward the United States as an example of a multiethnic and multilingual country which became a nation in the space
of only a century or so. However, the United States was formed before
diversity of languages and ethnicities reached a statistically significant
level. At the time of the founding of the United States in the 1770s,
the white population of North America on the eastern seaboard was
predominantly Anglo-Saxon in ethnic origin, and the use of English
was nearly universal, despite pockets of (largely bilingual) Dutch and
German settlers. All of the delegates to the Continental Congress of
1776, for example, were native English speakers. The Americans of
1776 were in fact largely transplanted Englishmen, by no means all of
whom wanted independence, who arrived as products of the same long
line of political evolution which flowed through the Magna Carta, the
Enlightenment, and English common law. And the United States of
course suffered through a terrible civil war before a true national sense
of identity emerged.
So the United States is not an exception to the lengthy timeline
of nation formation, although in formulating foreign policy we often
project a cultural assumption to the contrary and imagine that if we
Americans can all get along, other countries can too. Once formed,
nations can and do continue to evolve and mature politically and often
become more multiethnic—although as the current influx of Syrian
3      Leonard Zusne and Warren H. Jones, Anomalistic Psychology: A Study of Magical Thinking
(Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1989), 13.
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refugees into Europe clearly shows, this is frequently a contested process.
In rare cases, independent nations with their own constitutions and
common interests may join to form a federation, such as Switzerland,
for example, where politically-independent and self-governing French,
Italian and German-speaking nations have evolved a sense of loyalty to
the Swiss Federation and identify as Swiss.4 This process occurred over
nearly a millennium.
The term “nation-building” is often carelessly misused to mean the
process of encouraging broader respect for civil rights and enhancing
democracy within a young, existing nation, which is properly called state
building. Unlike nation-building, which is impossible, state building is
not only possible but usually beneficial to the collective world community of democratic nations. As has been often pointed out, democracies
rarely go to war with one another. When a country is a nation, and all the
necessary precursors of democracy are present, it is possible for foreign
powers to encourage a fledgling democracy with an array of support for
the democratic process, from providing election observers and monitors, to financial support to educational programs designed to enhance
understanding of the political process, to incentives and pressure for
inclusiveness, protection of minorities and observance of civil rights.
Not understanding the Nation Rule and its First Corollary have led
the United States into tragedy on several occasions since the end of
World War II, most notably in Vietnam and again in the 21st century
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are nations,
and in both countries only a tiny handful of western-educated politicians claim otherwise, too often as a vehicle for pushing their personal
agendas. Unfortunately, these citizen outliers are usually the only Iraqis
and Afghans with whom US leaders ever come into contact, which can
create a very erroneous sense of those countries. In fact, there was never
any chance of establishing a sustainable liberal democracy in either Iraq
or Afghanistan because of the Nation Rule and its First Corollary. Only
a profound ignorance of those countries or magical thinking could have
led anyone to think that democracy would be sustainable in either. Not
only are Iraq and Afghanistan patently not nations, they also both lack
virtually all of the other precursors of a democratic society.

The Nation Rule and Counterinsurgency

This brings us to the subject of“counterinsurgency,” which is what a
government in power calls a civil war. The dictionary definition of a civil
war is simply “a war between citizens of the same country.” If a country
is a nation, one of those groups will be small, but even small groups
can wage civil wars which are bloody and protracted. The civil wars in
Nepal and in India (against the Naxalite movement) are good examples
of this. The government in power typically refers to a rebellion by some
of its citizens as an “insurgency,” and to the rebels as “bandits.” If the
United States government supports the government of that country,
it uses the same terminology. If the United States supports the rebels,
however, it calls the conflict a civil war. The current conflict in Syria,
for example, is referred to by the US government as a civil war, because
4      Norman Berdichevsky, Nations, Language and Citizenship (London: McFarland & Co., Inc.,
2004), 92.
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the United States does not support the Bashar al-Assad regime and does
not want al-Assad to win the conflict and remain in power. Conversely,
the United States supports the current government of Afghanistan, and
refers to its current civil war with the Taliban as an “insurgency.” But
both the Taliban and the people fighting them in Afghanistan are inarguably “citizens of the same country,” so there is no possible way that
Afghanistan today does not meet the dictionary definition of a civil war.
Semantics employing words with deeply embedded meaning forms an
integral part of the strategic messaging intended to create and frame the
discourse within which US foreign policy is conducted.
“Counterinsurgency” is not a hoary principle of warfare whose
origins are lost in the mists of time. The first use of the word counterinsurgency in the English language was in 1962.5 The term is in fact a
creation of Kennedy administration wordsmiths seeking to put a trendy
and politically-palatable name to the fight against the communist nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh in the civil war then taking place within South
Vietnam. On the other side of that civil war at that time were US-backed
South Vietnam and those loyal to South Vietnamese dictator Ngo Dinh
Diem. The Kennedy administration supported the government of South
Vietnam and invented the word counterinsurgency to represent its doctrine of defense support to both South Vietnam and Laos. The doctrine
itself may have been shaped by the Eisenhower administration in the
eighteen months before Kennedy took office, as historian R.B. Smith
suggests, but the word itself was first used in 1962, and it is therefore a
child of the Kennedy administration.6 Counterinsurgency is not a strategy, it is a bundle of political-military tactics used by the government in
power and its international supporters to try to win a civil war.
Few topics have generated more discussion, more debate, and more
publications within security policy circles in the past ten years than this
word counterinsurgency and its accompanying doctrine. Scholars and
practitioners have weighed in with books and articles both praising the
US Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency and inveighing against it. It
is a large body of literature. Virtually all of it, however, misses the fundamental strategic fact: No “counterinsurgency,” or suppression of a civil
war, has succeeded since the end of World War II in a country which was
not a nation. The Vietnam War is included in this analysis, since citizens
in South Vietnam fought against each other. Vietnam was of course a
larger nation divided north and south, and thus also in that sense a civil
war. Success in this case is defined as “the ruling power at the beginning
of the conflict remained the ruling power, or shared some power after
the end of armed hostilities.” This is the Second Corollary of the Nation
Rule: Wars can be won by countries which are not democracies, but they
are not won by countries which are not nations. (The Iraq–Iran War of
1980-1988, which cost the lives of nearly a half a million people, does
not qualify as an exception to the Second Corollary because it ended in
a stalemate.)
The Third Corollary of the Nation Rule, and for a discussion of
counterinsurgency the most important, is that since World War II, no
5     “Counterinsurgency,” Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/counter
insurgency.
6      R.B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1983),
185.
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country which was not a nation, and no nation with a government perceived by less than 85 to 90 percent of its population to be the sole
legitimate ruling authority has ever won a civil war/counterinsurgency.
Ever. If the goal of counterinsurgency doctrine is to increase the level
of legitimacy or support for the ruling government, then it is an abject
failure. That has never happened. No counterinsurgency in history has
ever resulted in an increase in legitimacy for the national government.
There is no historical evidence of this, and mountains of historical evidence demonstrating that both the legitimacy of central governments
and the willingness of the people to absorb the costs of the war decline
during a civil war.7 To paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, “you go to war with the government you have.”8
Invariably, government actions to defeat the rebelling group erode
allegiance to the state, reduce support for the war, and decrease the legitimacy of the government. Curtailed civil liberties, the inconveniences,
stress and dangers of heightened security, the hardships of periodic or
continuing shortages of goods, services and utilities such as water and
electricity, the higher taxes usually imposed to pay for the war, conscription of youth, casualties to relatives serving in the forces of both sides,
and the destruction of homes and property all degrade acceptance of
government authority and damage its legitimacy. No one living in a war
zone being pummeled by these inevitable side effects of war increases
their support for their government because of the delivery of a school or
a well. Rebel atrocities may cause a temporary spike in popular support
for the war, but the trend line is always downward. You start with the
allegiance you have: It can go down as a result of poor policies and
inept security measures, but it never goes up. And historically, every
nation which has had the allegiance of less than 85 to 90 percent of its
population at the outbreak of a civil conflict has lost the war. Having 85
percent support or better does not ensure success. It is possible to have
that much support and lose. As Martin van Creveld notes, “attempts by
post-1945 armed forces to suppress guerrillas…have constituted a long,
almost unbroken record of failure.”9 However, without nationhood and
legitimacy, the insurgents will always win.
Empirical data proves this: When a country is not a nation, the
government loses. When a country is a nation and the government is
not perceived as legitimate and worth dying for by 85 to 90 percent of
the population, the government loses. Empirical data also proves that
counterinsurgency tactics intended to increase support for a country’s
government, such as the “clear, hold and build” tactics intended to
increase support for the Afghan government, for example, are a total

7      For an excellent survey of this large body of literature, see Bethany Lacina, Public Support for
Domestic Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Thailand (Rochester: University of Rochester, 2015), http://
harris.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/Lacina_CivilWarCasualties_Spring2015_1.pdf.
8      “Rumsfeld: You Go to War with the Army You Have,” YouTube Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jPgljRvzQw.
9      Martin van Creveld, The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq (New York: Presidio
Press, 2008), 219.

Is Nation Building a Myth?

Mason

73

failure, and that tactics based on “sweeping operations” don’t work at
all.10
When a country is a nation, and its government is perceived as
legitimate by the great majority of its people, what works in counterinsurgency are two things: First, isolating the people from the guerillas
and vice versa by stationing a small garrison in every village to reinforce
and support a village militia, like the Marine Corps’ Combined Action
Program (CAP) in Vietnam. This is a static, defensive mission which
atomizes most battalions into squads and results in a war run by squad
leaders. For this reason, the US Army hates it, but it works. No village
protected by a CAP element in Vietnam was ever retaken by the Viet
Cong. Second, regular and aggressive patrolling around villages and
towns by military forces (not by weak and poorly armed police) in order
to prevent guerillas from massing in numbers which could threaten local
defenses, and thus provide a dynamic ring of security around civilians.
This was never done in Afghanistan, where the US military preferred
instead a Groundhog Day loop of ineffectual battalion-sized “sweeping
operations.” The Taliban simply attrited US forces during these operations with improvised explosive devices, mines, and snipers, and flowed
back into the “swept” areas as soon as US forces left. Local forces left
behind were simply too weak or too corrupt to resist in Afghanistan, as
they also were in Vietnam. The only thing which battalion-scale sweeping operations accomplished was demonstrating tactical proficiency in
maneuvering a battalion.
A common error in the analysis of civil war/insurgency is the conflation of “popular support” and “legitimacy of governance,” a mistake
made, for example, by the Rand Corporation study authored by Seth
Jones in 2008.11 Much of the literature of counterinsurgency is a discussion of “popular support.” However, popular support as such, which is
further often reduced to “popularity,” and measured by opinion polls,
is actually irrelevant. What matters is a much more subtle attribute: the
extent to which a government is believed to have the legitimate authority
to rule and be obeyed. They are quite different things. For example, let’s
say I am a poor citizen of a country which is not a nation and which is
experimenting with democracy. In an election, I vote for a candidate, but
another candidate from another ethnic group commits massive fraud,
steals the election, and takes power (as happened in Afghanistan in 2014,
for example).12 I do not perceive that person as having legitimate authority over me, or to be the legitimate government of my country. If that
person then gives me $1,000, I may briefly have a better opinion of him.
He may briefly be more popular with me. However, and this is critical,
it will not make him more legitimate in my eyes, or increase the likelihood of me joining his army, or increase even slightly my willingness to
fight and die to keep him in power. Popularity may be measured with
10      Dr. Jennifer Brick, The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008), https://www.bu.edu/aias/brick.pdf.
Statistical survey conducted by University of Pittsburgh led by Dr. Jennifer Brick, discussion with
Dr. Brick 2011, “Afghanistan: USAID ‘Stability’ Programs Increased Support For Taliban,” Breitbart
News, November 2, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/11/02/afghanistanusaid-stability programs-increased-support-taliban.
11      Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), http://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf.
12      Chris Mason, “Fraud and Folly in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, September 23, 2014, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/23/fraud-and-folly-in-afghanistan.
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polling; legitimacy may not. Opinion polling in counterinsurgency is
thus worthless, even if fear and cultural norms do not prevent people
from answering honestly.
Another common but false cultural assumption is that legitimacy of
governance only comes from democracy. Because the United States has
always has been a democracy, few of us can conceive of a legitimate government being derived any other way. But as Max Weber wrote a century
ago, the legal basis for legitimacy of governance (of which democracy
is one form) is only one of a number of ways in which governmental
authority may be derived and respected. Legitimacy may also come from
religious leadership, for example, or from a line of kings. The Emperor
of Japan in the late nineteenth century had absolute legitimacy of governance. His right to rule Japan was literally unquestioned, and to fight and
die for the emperor was the highest honor to which a citizen could ever
aspire. Today in communist China, the legitimate authority of the communist party is virtually unchallenged apart from a very small number
of political dissenters, and few Chinese would ever think of disobeying
the edicts of the party, or hesitate to fight in the military, or refuse to
follow orders leading to death in battle. Neither the Japanese Army or
the Chinese Army suffers from mass attrition, or mass desertions, or
mass cowardice in battle, something which is almost universally true
historically of the armies of nations, however their legitimacy is derived.
But democracy is not an essential element for success in a civil war/
counterinsurgency, nor is the popularity of the government, but both
being a nation, and the perception of 85 to 90 percent of the population
that their government has legitimate authority over them and is worth
fighting for are essential elements of success. Again, there are no exceptions. This chart of a number of post-World War II examples illustrates
this point:
CONFLICT
NATION?
LEGITIMACY
OUTCOME
Malaya
Yes
90%
Gov’t Won
Afghanistan 79-89
No
10%
Gov’t Lost
Afghanistan 01-15
No
30%
Gov’t Lost
Northern Ireland*
Yes
91-99%
Gov’t Won
Iraq 2003-15
No
40%
Gov’t Lost
Peru 1980-2000
Yes
95%
Gov’t Won
Vietnam 1964-1975
Yes
50%
Gov’t Lost
Columbia vs FMLN
Yes
98%
Gov’t Won
Nepal vs Maoists
Yes
95%
Gov’t Won
Sudan
No
50%
Gov’t Lost
This chart illustrates the relationship between nationhood, legitimate government and the
outcome of civil wars.* The civil war in Northern Ireland is not covered in the article text due
to space limitations. However, Ireland is certainly a nation, as defined for this article. Support
for the IRA is also difficult to gauge, but in the 1987 Irish general election the IRA won only 1.7
percent of the vote. As recently as 2011, the political wing of the IRA, Sinn Fein, still only won
9.9 percent of the vote in the Irish general election.
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A strategic overview of these civil wars examining the Nation Rule
and its corollaries will be instructive. A good first example is the civil
war which was fought in Nepal from 1996 to 2006. Nepal is a nation—
a country in which the great majority of the people self-identify at the
national level. The Communist Party of Nepal fought a Maoist “people’s
war” and sought to create a communist government. The Maoists had
the support of a small minority of the Nepali people, certainly less than
10 percent,13 and the government, while not entirely popular, was considered legitimate by a large majority. In the end, Nepal did not become
communist, or become two countries. It stayed together as one country,
changes were made to the system of government, popular representation
was improved, grievances were addressed, and to the enormous credit of
the Nepali people, that nation is putting those terrible years behind it.
Another example of a civil war brought to a successful conclusion
in a nation was the war against the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, in
Peru from 1980 to roughly 2000. The rebellion was (and it still exists in
minimal form) initially a “charismatic leader” guerilla movement with a
Maoist communist ideology which, like the Maoist movement in Nepal,
claimed to struggle for the poor and dispossessed. The movement’s
first leader was Abimael Guzmán. At its peak, the Sendero Luminoso did
not have more than 15 percent popular support.14 Peru is a nation, and
its government is perceived by the majority as legitimate. As a result,
despite the use of some poor government tactics which eroded support
in several provinces, the government was able to suppress the movement, and it caught a lucky break when it captured Abimael Guzmán in
1992 and his successor, Óscar Ramírez in 1999, effectively decimating
the threat.
The Marxist rebellion in Colombia, which grew out of la violencia
and the socialist movements of the 1930s, is a good example of how
even a small number of guerillas can keep fighting for decades, only to
be defeated by demographics. Colombia also meets the Nation Rule, and
the FARC, which emerged as the predominant rebel group in Colombia
around 1964, only had and has the support of about two percent of the
Colombian population.15 It also was initially able to maintain a small but
steady flow of recruits from the rural areas with a Marxist message of
land reform in a country where 50 percent of the arable land is owned by
less than one percent of the population.16 The war has gone on for more
than half a century, claiming the lives of some 220,000 Colombians.17
Successive Colombian governments were either unwilling or unable to
13      Actual support for the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) movement, abbreviated as
CPN(M), is difficult to calculate, but a Nepalese government report released in 2003 stated a strength
of 31,500 combatants, 48,000 militia, 150,500 active cadres and 100,000 sympathizers, a total of
some 300,000 Nepalese. Even allowing this report to be wrong by a factor of ten still yields only
3,000,000 supporters, or 11 percent of a total population of around 27 million. The actual figure at
the height of the conflict was probably no more than five percent.
14      Charles D. Kenney, Fujimori’s Coup and the Breakdown of Democracy in Latin America (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2004).
15      Alfredo Rangel, “The FARC’s Escalating Demands; Ongoing Attacks and Intransigence
Demonstrate that It Doesn’t Really Want Peace,” Americas Quarterly, Fall 2013, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/farcs-escalating-demands-ongoing-attacks-and-intransigence-demonstrateit-doesnt-really.
16      Teo Ballvé, “Colombia’s Chance for Peace,” New York Times, May 23, 2014, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/05/24/opinion/colombias-chance-for-peace.html?_r=0.
17      Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (The National Center for Historical Memory), http://
www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/en/about-the-national-center-about-the-national-center.
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dismantle the power of Colombia’s tiny clique of wealthy landowning
families and implement real agrarian reforms which would undercut the
FARC’s peasant appeal. However, over the last half-century, the bulk
of Colombia’s population has shifted from the rural areas (which the
government could not control) to the urban areas (which it can). The
percentage of the population living in urban areas doubled from 31
percent in 1937 to 62 percent in 1972 to nearly 80 percent today, and
the FARC has virtually no support in the urban areas of Colombia.18
In other words, the slow death of the FARC is not so much a result
of military action as it is an accident of changing urban demographics
combined with a half a century of sustained investment in health care
and education in the rural areas.
A textbook proof of the Nation Rule and its corollaries is the
Malayan Emergency, the term used for the civil war which took place
inside the British colony of Malaya in the 1950s (The insurance company
Lloyds of London would not have covered the insured losses of the
British plantation owners in the colony if it had been called a “war,” so
it was called an “emergency” instead). The British army today loves to
cite its success in suppressing the civil war there as an example of how
it “knows how to do counterinsurgency,” and attribute its success to
its tactics. In fact, this civil war was like a game of Monopoly in which
one player starts the game owning every property on the Monopoly
game board and has two hotels on every property, and the other player
starts the game owning one utility, such as the Electric Company. The
outcome was predetermined, if the British did not foul it up too badly.
In the event, they nearly did.
In the first place, Malaya was a British colony. There was no “host
government” to deal with, as there was in Saigon, Baghdad, and Kabul.
It would be like the United States combatting a civil war in Puerto Rico.
The British not only controlled every aspect of military and political
policy in the territory, they could relieve anyone in any position at any
time, make any law, and enforce any regulation they wished to. They were
the government. The Ministry of Defense was not in a foreign country,
in Kabul or Saigon, it was in London. The enormous advantage which
this conveyed to the British is almost incalculable. Second, the colony
of Malaya was (and still is, as the nation of Malaysia today), a territory in
which approximately 90 percent of the inhabitants are ethnically Malay
and speak the Malay language, and 10 percent are ethnically Chinese
and speak Chinese.19 Thus, Malaya was a nation. Almost without a single
exception, the guerillas seeking to overthrow British colonial rule were
from the 10 percent ethnic Chinese minority. They were disliked by
virtually all the ethnic Malays (and frequently discriminated against
by them, which led to some legitimate grievances). However, under no
circumstances did the ethnic Malays want to be ruled by the Chinese
minority, and they virtually unanimously supported British rule.
The British essentially guaranteed this loyalty by promising independence to the colony with an ethnically-Malay ruling government
18      Carmen Elisa and Elssy Bonilla, “The Demographic Transition in Colombia,” United
Nations University, http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu10we/uu10we09.htm; and
United Nations, Population Division, “World Population Prospects,” http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp.
19      T. Dugdale-Pointon, “The Malayan Emergency (1947-1960),” August 26, 2007, http://www.
historyofwar.org/articles/wars_malaya.html.
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as soon as the “emergency” was over. So all the Malays had to do to
gain their independence was defeat the minority Chinese guerillas they
hated. Thus the British began their suppression of this insurgency/civil
war with the absolute loyalty and active assistance of 90 percent of the
population, and the capability of the rawest new British Army arrival
from Liverpool to visually identify anyone who could possibly be a guerilla from his facial features at a distance of 30 yards, as Chinese and
Malays have very different physiognomies. Furthermore, the Chinese
population of the colony was confined to very small, very well-known,
and very ethnically homogenous rural areas, and they had no support
outside these areas. In short, the British had every conceivable military
and political advantage—the entire Monopoly game board—before the
war started. And it was still a hard fight which lasted 12 years and cost
the lives of some 10,000 people.20 The notion that because of this experience the British “know how to do counterinsurgency” is inane.
In stark contrast to the successful outcomes in Peru, Nepal,
Colombia, and Malaya (from the government point of view) are the
failed US efforts in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Vietnam was a
nation divided in half, and Iraq and Afghanistan have never been and
probably never will be nations. In all three cases, civil wars were temporarily stalemated militarily by powerful American forces at enormous
cost; however, in all cases, the central government lacked legitimacy
and neither the government in Saigon, Baghdad, or Kabul ever came
anywhere near the 85 to 90 percent legitimacy threshold. The Afghan
government, on its best day in the last 14 years, has had the support of
perhaps 30 percent of the population. Today it is less than 20 percent.21
Support for the South Vietnamese governments of the emperor Bo
Dai, then President Diem, and then his various military successors after
1963 similarly never exceeded 50 percent of the total population, and it
steadily declined between 1960 and 1975. The Sunnis, Shi’a, Kurds, and
other minority groups of Iraq today can scarcely agree on what time
of day it is, much less a government, and it was only Saddam Hussein’s
brutal totalitarian dictatorship which kept that country together within
its British colonial-era boundaries.22 Forests have been cleared to make
the paper for books and articles about which tactics worked and did not
work in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, but at the strategic level of war,
all three were lost politically before they began because (1) the countries
did not meet the Nation Rule, and (2) they did not have governments
perceived as legitimate by 85 to 90 percent of their citizens.
Another example of a failed counterinsurgency or unsuccessful civil
war is the conflict which raged in the Sudan, the so-called Second Sudanese
Civil War, from 1983 to 2005 (which was essentially a continuation of
the First Sudanese Civil War fought from 1955 to 1972). Like so many of
the world’s trouble spots today, Sudan, formerly Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,
was another 19th-century creation of European colonial mapmakers. It
became independent in 1956, but it was never a nation. The southern
20      Indeed, the war flared up again in the 1960s, again waged by Chinese guerillas, and last
another 22 years before being suppressed again.
21      Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan (Carlisle, PA: US
Army War College Press, 2015), 66.
22      “With Iraq Mired in Turmoil, Some Call for Partitioning the Country,” New York Times, April
28, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/middleeast/with-iraq-mired-in-turmoilsome-call-for-partitioning-the-country.html?_r=0.
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part of the country (today South Sudan) was predominantly Christian
and animist, and is ethnically and linguistically African. The northern
part of the country (today North Sudan) was predominantly Muslim and
ethnically Arab. Because the bureaucrats at the United Nations and the
US State Department effectively consider the re-drawing of world maps
to be institutional failure, enormous diplomatic efforts were expended
to keep these two nations together in one country as the civil war raged,
and it resulted in the deaths of some two million people.23 If the world
powers which approached the problem from the standpoint of keeping
that country together at all costs had instead simply recognized that
it was in fact two separate nations, much of this tragedy could have
been prevented. As it was, the unsuccessful “counterinsurgency” failed
because Sudan as it was created in 1956 was not a nation. Now it is
two nations, a historical wrong caused by British colonialism has been
righted, and both nations may now begin the achingly slow process of
state-building essentially from ground zero.

Conclusion

Nation-building is impossible. Nations are not built. They form
almost imperceptibly from inside over long spans of historical time. All
of the civil wars, or “insurgencies,” which have been fought since the
end of World War II can be analyzed and fully understood using the
Nation Rule and its corollaries. Field Manual 3-24 is wrong. It makes
the false assumption that support for an existing government can be
increased during a civil war/insurgency as a result of the counterinsurgents’ actions and activities. There is no historical evidence or empirical
data of any kind to support such an assumption. Two exhaustive studies
of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, for example, show there was,
in one study, statistically zero increase in support for the national government after the delivery of “clear, hold, and build” efforts such as
schools, roads, and clinics. In the second study, the increase in support
where it occurred was so small as to be statistically irrelevant, and in a
greater number of cases, the “delivery of government services” actually
led to an increase in instability and a loss government legitimacy by
upending preexisting village political economies.
The lesson from these principles is obvious:
(A) if a country is a nation, and…
(B) the government of that nation is perceived by 85 to 90 percent
of its population to have the legitimate authority to rule over them and
inspire, coerce or compel obedience, then…
it is possible for the national government to win a civil war if:
(1) it makes most of the right political moves to prevent excessive
erosion of legitimacy, and…
(2) it separates the people from the guerillas and does not make
many military mistakes, such as massacres of civilians, habitat destruction, or the always unpopular mass relocation of villagers, and…
23      “US Committee for Refugees, 2001,” Archived December 10, 2004 on the Internet Archive.
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(3) it gets a couple lucky breaks in the fog of war—an important
rebel leader being captured at a routine traffic stop, for example, or a raid
on a low-level guerilla cell finding high-level intelligence materials. (The
war in Peru against the Sendero Luminoso turned on just such a chance
event.)24
If both A and B are not true at the beginning of the conflict, then
government failure is certain. If A and B are true, and the government
does (1) and (2), above, and gets a lucky break or two, success in the conflict is possible. But the notion of “winning hearts and minds” with such
tactics as “clear, hold, and build” is dead wrong. There are no historical
cases of a government increasing its legitimacy during a civil war, much
less increasing it from a sub-critical mass below 85 to 90 percent to above
critical mass. “Nation-building” and “counterinsurgency” in Vietnam,
Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq were tragic, multi-trillion dollar failures
because the Nation Rule and its three immutable Corollaries were not
respected. More damning for the US military is that failed tactics were
repeated over and over again in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, long
after it was clear they did not work, and it stubbornly clung to doctrine
long after it was clear it was wrong.
Before elected leaders commit US military forces to war in a
foreign country, military leaders need to make an objective determination whether the country is a nation, and if so, whether its government
is accepted as legitimate by 85 to 90 percent of its citizens, and if so,
whether all of the other precursors of democracy are present. If not, the
military must have a viable plan for getting back out of the failed-state
quagmire which will inevitably follow. Installing a government which
we conjured into being and then proclaimed to be legitimate when none
of those things was true in Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan
was the dictionary definition of magical thinking. The determination
of a country’s social capital cannot be obtained from the likes of Ngô
Đình Diem, Ahmed Chalabi and Hamid Karzai and their coteries, or
from first-generation Americans with their own axes to grind. It cannot
be obtained from political appointees with policy agendas to pursue.
Nor can it be obtained from the State Department, whose institutional
dogma holds that history and culture are irrelevant and that every
country can be a democracy within its existing borders after the magic
spell of an election is cast. Rather, such determinations must be derived
from the consensus of the men and women who have spent their professional lives studying the country in question. In Vietnam, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, those men and women were not simply disregarded, they
were literally deliberately barred from policy discussions because their
views did not agree with what policy-makers wanted to do.25 Too many
Americans in the last half-century have paid with their lives for the folly
of disregarding the Nation Rule.

24      The leader of the Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzman, was captured in 1992 after a government agent found an empty tube of psoriasis medicine in a trash dumpster outside a ballet studio.
Guzman was known to suffer from psoriasis. The ensuing capture of Guzman and several other
rebel leaders decimated the charismatic leader movement.
25      Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, 193-196.

